

1964

## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

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fourth, or a fifth as much, based on their living standards. I believe in the necessity of a safe place to work and fair standards of productivity. I do not believe that a man should be replaced by a nut, a bolt, or a transistor without protection of his rights as a human being.

Mechanization for American ships, however, needs early solution. In all segments of the maritime field—management and labor alike—find the opinion exists that it is no longer a question as to whether we will automate, but how soon we will be forced to it by foreign competition. And indeed, if we are forced to it, we may be forced out. It may then be too late.

Where does that leave us? Can we reconcile the differences, meet the objections, and work out a plan of procedure?

I believe so—but only through the procedures familiar to labor and management in working out collective bargaining agreements. It is the classic method of democracy—give-and-take, consideration of alternatives, offers, and counteroffers, compromise, and finally agreement.

No solution formulated by one group and forced on the others could possibly succeed. It is useless for labor or management to look to Government to hand down the answers from on high. Even if Government had all the answers, the problems would not be solved without willing agreement and cooperation from all concerned. This must be a cooperative effort.

Which brings me to a final conviction relative to the American merchant marine. It is this: Success in the future is in our hands—those of industry, labor, and Government. The future of this Nation's shipping rests with each and every one of us. That success will be—can be—only what we individually and collectively achieve.

It is a solemn thought. Let us, then, all join in building an American merchant marine that can surpass any in the past because it is tailored to meet the needs of our Nation's future.

In the words of our President, "Come let us reason together."

### San Fernando Valley Clergymen Oppose Becker Amendment

#### EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

**HON. JAMES C. CORMAN**

OF CALIFORNIA  
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, June 11, 1964

Mr. CORMAN. Mr. Speaker, it has been charged that those who oppose the proposed Becker amendment are "against God." This has been completely refuted by the many religious leaders of all faiths who have testified and submitted statements to the House Judiciary Committee against this proposal.

Now, 36 ministers and rabbis from my district have issued a statement against the Becker amendment. Their statement recognizes the threat to religious freedom from this proposal and calls upon Congress to keep religion strong by keeping it free from Government interference.

I am deeply gratified that these clergymen have spoken out on this vital issue. I commend them for their statement. This action demonstrates once again that the clergy can be a positive force

and exercise moral leadership on important questions facing the Nation. This is in the best tradition of religion in America.

The statement follows:

STATEMENT OF 30 MINISTERS OF THE WEST VALLEY MINISTERIAL ASSOCIATION AND 16 RABBIS

We, the ministers of the San Fernando Valley, wish to protect and strengthen America's heritage of religious freedom. We are frightened by attempts to tamper with the Bill of Rights; i.e., the Becker amendment, which was the outgrowth of our Founding Fathers' concern for man's spirit. Therefore, we call upon our legislators to preserve the first amendment to the Constitution and its guarantee of no Government interference with our faith.

### Israel and the Front Door

#### EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

**HON. ABRAHAM J. MULTER**

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, June 11, 1964

Mr. MULTER. Mr. Speaker, last week President Johnson took another step in his continuing efforts to show that this country is firmly behind our best friend in the Middle East, the democratic State of Israel.

By formally receiving Israel Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, the President has again reaffirmed our commitment to this struggling young nation's security.

I command to the attention of our colleagues the following column in the May 31, 1964, edition of the New York Herald Tribune in which the distinguished columnist, Roscoe Drummond, comments on Mr. Eshkol's visit:

#### ISRAEL AND THE FRONT DOOR

(By Roscoe Drummond)

WASHINGTON.—The United States is host this week to an important head of Government who isn't asking for anything, doesn't want anything, and against whom we have been undiplomatically warned.

This should make for interesting conversation when the new Prime Minister of Israel, Levi Eshkol, sits down in the White House to talk with President Johnson.

It will be a unique, a valuable, and, to some, an unwelcome event.

This is a unique event because, strange as it is, this is the first time that an Israeli Prime Minister has been officially invited by the President to visit the United States. David Ben-Gurion, during the 15 years he was Prime Minister, came to the United States numerous times—but never at the formal invitation of the Government. He conferred with U.S. Presidents, but never officially and never in Washington. They would meet unofficially—and almost surreptitiously—usually in a suite in a New York hotel.

President Johnson, a very direct individual, changed this way of dealing with the Israeli Prime Minister when he gave a personal letter to Sargent Shriver to present to Mr. Eshkol several months ago.

I said that to some Mr. Eshkol's presence in Washington is unwelcome—unwelcome to the Arab nations despite the fact that the USSR has us as friends.

The Arab governments disliked the Eshkol

visit so much that they went to the extreme and inappropriate length of directing their 12 Ambassadors to wait on Secretary Rusk en masse. Undoubtedly their words were punctilious, but their message was obvious. The message was: don't be too cordial to Premier Eshkol.

I doubt that Mr. Rusk had any difficulty with this odd overture. He undoubtedly thanked his visitors for their courtesy and their counsel and made it clear that, while the United States esteems its friends—and considers itself a good friend of the Arab countries—it cannot allow its friends to determine whom its other friends shall be. President Johnson made that clear in taking Premier Eshkol's name off the back door and putting it on the front door of the White House.

There is no doubt that President Johnson has done this deliberately, not to be provocative to Arab sensitivities but to make it authoritatively clear that he stands undeviatingly behind the considered statement of policy which President Kennedy made on May 8, 1963, when he said that "if aggression occurred (in the Middle East) the United States would take action through the United Nations and on its own."

Apart from General Arab antipathy to Israel, the threat of military action against Israel has been specifically and, in recent weeks, repeatedly made by President Nasser of Egypt.

Here are Nasser declarations which give deep concern to Premier Eshkol and genuine anxiety to President Johnson:

"The triumph of peace and freedom lies in \* \* \* the liquidation of Israel's existence."

"Israel will not be able to escape this fate."

Premier Eshkol is not asking for U.S. arms to offset the sale of Soviet weapons to the United Arab Republic, but he is hopeful that President Johnson will sense from their first-hand talks what it means to live under the gun.

U.S. policy is not anti-Arab—it is anti-aggression from either side. Our goal is genuine peaceful coexistence. Mr. Eshkol's official presence in Washington is quiet but clear evidence that President Johnson does not intend to allow Mr. Nasser to be unaware of his position.

### I Fought in Vietnam

#### EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

**HON. CHARLES E. CHAMBERLAIN**

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, June 11, 1964

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. Speaker, last month I called to the attention of my colleagues a timely and revealing article in the May 18 issue of the U.S. News & World Report which was based on information supplied by Mr. Robert L. Moore, Jr., a freelance writer who was attached to United States and Vietnamese fighting units in South Vietnam. Since that time Mr. Moore has returned to this country and has come to Washington where a number of the members of the Armed Services Committee and others question him at length about his experiences and approach to the conduct of the war against the Vietcong. Through the good offices of

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Chairman CARL VINSON, Mr. Moore's views were also made known to high ranking Defense Department officials. Because of the importance of Mr. Moore's knowledge of the situation and the continuing crisis over developments in southeast Asia, under leave to extend my remarks in the Record I wish to make available to all Members of the House the substance of Mr. Moore's criticisms and recommendations. These are contained in an interview appearing in the June 8 issue of the U.S. News & World Report.

The interview follows:

"I FOUGHT IN VIETNAM"—INTERVIEW WITH AN AMERICAN JUST RETURNED FROM THE FRONT

(What's really going on in America's jungle war with the Communists in South Vietnam?

(Is it true that U.S. troops are being crippled by redtape—and by inept Vietnamese officers who don't want to fight? Is it time for the United States to move in, take command of a war that is costing heavy casualties and a million dollars a day?)

(You get candid—and knowledgeable—answers from an American observer, who, though not a member of the Armed Forces, was permitted to go into combat with U.S. guerrilla fighters. In this interview with U.S. News & World Report, Robert L. Moore, Jr., tells how the war is being lost—and how he thinks it can be won.)

Question. Mr. Moore, we note that Members of Congress have been interested in your story. Why?

Answer. They're trying to get at all the facts about the war in Vietnam. I've told them all I know from the level of the fighting man. I spent 5 months in the field on patrols, slogging around, getting shot at and shooting back. I don't know the diplomatic story, except as I heard it in Saigon from, again, more fighting people.

Question. What's the point of view of the GI in Vietnam?

Answer. They call it the "war of no thanks." They say nobody back home knows what's going on, and doesn't give a damn.

Question. What about the other GI's—the Vietnamese GI's?

Answer. The Vietnamese GI's are good little fighters, and they do what they're told. It's too bad that Americans aren't telling them more of what to do and their Vietnamese officers less. The problem is Vietnamese leadership.

Question. Do people out there feel that Secretary of Defense McNamara knows what is going on at the fighting level?

Answer. I think he's finding out more and more, but there are some big gaps in what he is being told.

Mr. McNamara has been to Vietnam five times, wanting to learn what is going on, but he keeps getting a "snow job." It has become a sort of joke among the troops. You know, during his fourth visit, they called it "Saigon's fourth snowstorm." And then came "Saigon's fifth snowstorm."

The trouble is this: There are top officers and civilians who do not want to get across to him the acute problem which American officers—the lieutenants and captains and majors in the field—face with their Vietnamese counterparts.

By and large, the Vietnamese officers just don't want to fight. They don't want to get killed—and who does? But in their own war, in their own country, they object to fighting more than the Americans. We're willing to go in there and fight.

I think that Mr. McNamara is walled off from the lower ranks.

Question. How do Americans get out there in the first place? Do they volunteer for duty in Vietnam?

Answer. They volunteer for Special Forces—and now I'm talking only about Spe-

cial Forces, which makes up 6 percent of the Americans in Vietnam. The rest of the Americans are just sent out there as needed. Question. What's the job of Special Forces?

Answer. Special Forces do the direct anti-guerrilla fighting. They're the ones who are on the ground fighting directly with the Communist Vietcong.

Question. Are they the only ones in direct combat?

Answer. They are the only Americans who are in daily personal combat with the Vietcong, yes.

Question. What are all the other Americans doing?

Answer. Well, there are 15,000 troops there, of which about 3,000 are actually in the field doing a job. Roughly 1,000 of those are Special Forces. Many of the other 2,000 are battalion advisers, or are in some way working with the battalions and regiments that are actively engaged with the enemy.

Question. What are the other 12,000 doing?

Answer. They're in support positions. They're doing all the jobs that it takes for support—logistics.

Question. Are the Special Forces lumped in with the 3,000?

Answer. They weren't—until May 1, that is. Up to May 1, Special Forces was more or less an autonomous group over there. They reported through the theater commander, Gen. Paul D. Harkins, but they were pretty much on their own. They had their own funds and fought in their own way and did an excellent job. That is what Special Forces was created to do. It's what President Kennedy gave them a tremendous boost forward to do.

Question. It's a kind of elite corps, isn't it?

Answer. It is, very much so, yes.

Question. Has something happened to hamstring them?

Answer. Yes. As of May 1, the generals decided that this was not the way for them to operate. They would have to operate under MAAG—Military Assistance Advisory Group—which in turn works under MAC-V, which is Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

It's a step backward for Special Forces. Now they're put underneath conventional-thinking staff officers who do not appreciate the value and need for Special Forces and who are now trying to make them conventional. They weren't created to be conventional.

Question. You said they've all volunteered—

Answer. They're double volunteers. They volunteered, first, to be paratroopers, and, secondly, to be Special Forces.

Question. But did they volunteer to go to Vietnam, as such?

Answer. If you volunteer for Special Forces, you go all over the world. They know, when they volunteer, they're subject to being called into an office, given orders, and not seeing home again for 6 months.

Question. Are these the new Marines?

Answer. They do a different job from the Marines. The Marines are shock troops. Special Forces are not shock troops. They're not assault troops. They are primarily designed to be dropped into, or put into, an area under enemy control and to take native people, train them, and lead them in guerrilla war, or in an antiguerilla war.

Question. Are they making any headway in Vietnam?

Answer. They're very successful in Vietnam in their area.

Now, the way they work, each Special Forces A team has perhaps a 25-mile-diameter circle within which they operate, and

they constantly harass, will attack when they're very much outnumbered. They

completely demoralize the Communists within in their area. But there are only 40 A teams in all of Vietnam, and that's not very much to cover the large area they have.

Question. What is an A team?

Answer. A Special Forces A team is made up of 12 men—2 officers and 10 enlisted men. These people are trained in at least three languages. In the case of Vietnam, one of them always speaks Vietnamese, another always speaks French—perhaps they will have a man who speaks Chinese. They have two doctors. When I say doctors, they're medics, but they're as accomplished as any doctor when it comes to war wounds and tropical diseases.

They have two specialists in weapons—one heavy weapons and one light weapons. They have a specialist in communications. They have specialists in intelligence. And they have specialists in all the important skills which are required for guerrilla warfare or antiguerilla warfare.

An A team can be divided up into two A teams of six men each, if necessary—and this is done frequently in order to expand the amount of territory they can cover.

Question. Then do the Vietnamese have parallel A teams?

Answer. Yes, they do.

Question. And the American and Vietnamese teams work together?

Answer. They work together.

Question. Are men in the Vietnamese teams able people?

Answer. Not usually. That's the trouble. Up until recently, the Vietnamese A teams have just been soldiers with good political connections.

Question. But you said the enlisted men—

Answer. The Vietnamese Special Forces enlisted men aren't much good in this particular situation.

When I was talking about "the little man that fights," I was talking about the average private in the Vietnamese Army, or the average paramilitary type that Special Forces trains, who isn't even a regular soldier. They're Vietnamese civilians who sign a contract to fight for 8 months or a year with Special Forces, paid by American Special Forces. But unfortunately, the rules read now that they have to be commanded by Vietnamese Special Forces officers, and the American Special Forces can merely "advise" their counterparts. This has been the big problem.

In spite of this, the American Special Forces have been tremendous at getting results. They've had to trick their counterparts into ordering their men to fight; they deceive them into it; they do anything to get the job done.

Question. Are these Americans supposed to be fighting, or are they just training the Vietnamese to fight?

Answer. They're supposed to be training the Vietnamese to fight, but they're in actual combat themselves.

Question. Are there more Vietnamese than Americans involved?

Answer. There are 12 Vietnamese Special Forces men and 12 American Special Forces men. They work side by side, theoretically. And then under them are between 300 and 600, generally speaking, civilian irregulars—paramilitary types—who theoretically are being led and trained by the Vietnamese Special Forces. The Americans are telling the Vietnamese, their counterparts, how to do this job.

Question. Isn't most of the fighting actually being done by the regular Vietnamese Army units?

Answer. I'd say most of the fighting is being done by the Special Forces groups and their irregulars. In spite of the problems, still these irregulars are doing most of the fighting. They're the ones who are going in and ambushing. They're acting as guerrillas.

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To give you an example of how they work: On one of my last operations, we spent 7 days behind enemy lines. We were in an area that was completely controlled by a Vietcong regiment in Darlac Province, an area about 50 miles northeast of Banmethuot, which is a big pacified center—as peaceful a town as you'll ever see. But 50 miles away from there is this area of maybe 30 or 40 square miles that is completely dominated by a Vietcong regiment, plus other hard-core Vietcongs coming in all the time.

Two Special Forces men, Americans, went in with two Vietnamese Special Forces men and 100 of their well-trained civilian irregulars, Montagnards [mountain tribesmen]. In this case, and for 6 days just roamed through there, keeping off of paths. We set up three ambushes. We'd kill maybe only two or three people in an ambush, but we'd wound others, who would go off into the woods—and that was even worse for the Vietcong, because they'd die slowly. We destroyed 10 tons of food on that operation and destroyed one Vietcong village.

Then we got hit the last day. The U.S. sergeant led these Montagnards right up a hill and drove the Vietcong off. They had caught up with us, finally, and had us pinned down. But this is the way the Special Forces operate. And these are the people who are daily in contact with the Vietcong. The ARVN battalions sometimes will go in and sometimes won't.

Question. What do you mean—ARVN?

Answer. Army of Vietnam. They're called ARVN.

Question. Did you get air support in that kind of operation?

Answer. No, we couldn't, because if we had air support it would show where we were. We were guerrillas, never operating on paths, always up and down through tangled undergrowth. We'd come across a path, set up an ambush on it, and when the Vietcong would come along, we'd kill them, take their weapons.

We captured a Chinese copy of a Russian submachine gun. Also, we captured one Vietcong alive with a message from his headquarters telling him to find out what was going on in the area. All of a sudden the Vietcong commander was hearing fire fights, people weren't showing up, no communications. The Vietcong wanted to know, "What's happening?"

So this sort of operation can immobilize a whole Communist regiment. In other words, we're doing to them just what they were doing to us. This is what U.S. Special Forces are doing.

Question. Were you dropped by parachute?

Answer. No, we infiltrated.

Question. Then you fought your way out again?

Answer. Yes.

Question. How is this May 1 order going to change that kind of operation?

Answer. Well, they're changing the concept. I hope they're not going to destroy it. They're certainly changing the whole command aspect, so that Special Forces no longer command themselves. They're now going to have to get permission through the United States and Vietnamese armies' conventional commands to go out on these operations.

The whole secret of these things is to go out suddenly, not having to clear it, because there are so many people that are talking on the Vietnamese side that by the time it goes all the way up the chain of American command and down the Vietnamese command—somebody on the other side is apt to know.

Question. How does the casualty rate run if Americans do get into a fight?

Answer. On the particular operation I was describing, we had no casualties, even

though they ambushed us. We killed three in the ambush.

It was only because an American sergeant, a real combat man who had fought beginning in World War II, got the Montagnards up and made them charge, and so surprised and scared the Vietcongs and took them off balance that we were able to swarm all over them and kill and drive them off.

The Vietnamese Special Forces leaders seemed frozen. And we probably would have all been killed if we had let ourselves be pinned down.

You have, you know, seconds—less than seconds—to react in a case like that. It's amazing—not one man was even wounded. In fact, it was the first time, this sergeant said, he had ever seen it happen. I'm glad that was the one I was on.

Questions. Are there generally many casualties, though?

Answer. Yes. American casualties run about an average of 2 men wounded out of every 12 in action, and maybe 1 out of 24 gets killed. That's the way they figure it. Of 12 men who come over, they know they're going to get at least 2 men wounded.

Question. In what period of time?

Answer. In 6 months. I'm talking about Special Forces.

Question. Would you clear up one point on this A team business? You say that for 12 Americans on a team there are 300 to 600 irregulars under them—

Answer. Right. When you're talking about Special Forces operations, you're really talking about a lot of people. There are 40 A teams. The average A team has about 400 irregulars—some have more, some a little less.

Question. How reliable are these Vietnamese irregulars? Are some the kind who fight one week with the Vietcong and one week with South Vietnam?

Answer. You can figure about 10 percent in every camp is questionable. But, by and large, the irregulars are very good. They've been battle tested. They're good fighters. I've been out with them.

Question. Do they fight at night and work in the field during the day?

Answer. No. They live in a camp, and their families are there. They've got their wives and kids running all over the place; their pigs, their goats—everything is in the camp. The whole family lives with them, in a very well-fortified camp right in the middle of Vietcong territory. They go out from this camp on patrols. That's the way they operate.

Question. How did the U.S. Army happen to give you permission to go to Vietnam with the Special Forces in the first place?

Answer. Well, it was actually then Vice President Johnson's military aid who worked it out for me.

I'm writing a book on Special Forces right now. I've been working on it for a year. So Mr. Johnson's military aid questioned them at Fort Bragg, N.C., about my linking up with Special Forces. He got back a message: "Send him to jump school and then we'll talk to him." They figured I might get through one day of that and give up.

I think I'm the only civilian who's ever been through the regular military jump school. I went through at Fort Benning, Ga., in June of 1963. And when I got through with jump school all right, and got my jump wings, then they said: "Give him another test and put him through Operation Swift Strike," which was partially a Special Forces operation. It was a 90,000-man operation in South and North Carolina and Georgia last year. So I went through that and made a night jump with the Special Forces and went with them through the swamps in their training exercises—which, incidentally, was harder than anything I ever did in Vietnam except for the patrol I just described.

Question. How does the casualty rate run if Americans do get into a fight?

Answer. On the particular operation I

was through the Special Forces guerrilla course. And after that, they finally gave me an OK to go to Vietnam. I had complete carte blanche. I'd just get into an airplane and go to any Special Forces camp I wanted to, fight with them, live with them, go to another one.

Question. Were you permitted to fight?

Answer. You get ambushed sometimes or into a situation where the only thing to do is to be armed and try to keep the enemy at bullet's range—protect yourself by hitting him first.

#### WHERE EQUIPMENT IS GOOD

Question. Do they get good equipment in Special Forces?

Answer. Yes. This is one place where you can't criticize. The equipment is good. They've got all the ammunition they can use. And they've got just what they need.

They've got new types of weapons which are marvelous. They have the new M-79 grenade launcher—we call it the elephant gun—which is the finest weapon ever. This is one of the things which, I think, maybe kept us from suffering casualties in the ambush I mentioned. It launches a grenade almost 200 yards. It looks just like a shotgun. You carry it, and you shove the grenade in the back just like a shell, and shoot. This will wipe out about eight or 10 people where it lands. And the minute you get into an ambush, you start letting go with those things and then follow them up. It's a tremendous weapon.

Question. What are some of the other weapons?

Answer. The great Special Forces weapon is the AR-15, which is being manufactured now by Colt in Hartford, Conn. This is a .22-caliber weapon, but it has tremendous hitting power. It destroys, it kills, no matter where it hits. If it hits you in the hand it will break the bones all the way up and the shock will kill. And yet it's very light. I would carry as many as 400 rounds of ammunition on my belt without even feeling it.

Question. Is it a rifle?

Answer. It's an automatic rifle which fires in 20-round clips. It's so light that it makes a carbine feel heavy after you've been carrying one of these things around. This is the Special Forces standby weapon, and it is magnificent.

Question. Do we issue those to the Vietnamese, too?

Answer. They did for a while, and the Vietnamese were losing them to the Vietcong.

Question. Are most of the Vietcong weapons captured U.S. weapons?

Answer. I would say certainly many of them are. For every bunch of weapons you capture from the Vietcong, you find maybe 30 percent were made in the United States. You find a lot of old French weapons—and now you're finding a lot of Chinese copies of Russian weapons.

Question. Any Russian weapons?

Answer. I never saw one. I never heard of a Russian weapon being used by the Vietcong.

Question. What are the Chinese weapons like? Are they good quality?

Answer. No, they're not very good. One that we captured on about the second day of the patrol—one of our irregulars was carrying it when we were ambushed, and it jammed twice on him as he was going up the hill. He threw the thing down and got his own. In fact, we killed the man who was carrying it in the first place. We're getting a lot of Chinese weapons now. They copy Russian weapons, they copy our weapons as best they can.

Question. But are these weapons made in China?

Question. Did you ever see any evidence of direct Russian support for the Vietcong?

Answer. I've never seen it, and I don't know about it. What there is an indication of—and this is something I haven't read about yet—is we are hearing that individual Frenchmen are helping.

Question. Helping the Vietcong?

Answer. Yes, on an individual basis.

I know of an ambush which was set out in the II Corps area to try to hit a small Vietcong group that was coming through—it was a small ambush in platoon size, by our side. They were waiting for the last man to come through and then they would hit.

Well, they waited 2½ hours for the last man to come through, and they just held their breath that this column coming through from east to west—in other words, penetrating deeper into Vietnam—would not see them. As they were watching, every so often a Caucasian, speaking French, would walk by with the enemy. This happened in early April of this year.

Question. Do you mean the French are operating as a sort of special forces with the Vietcong?

Answer. I wouldn't say "the French," but there are Caucasians, speaking French, who many believe to be Frenchmen.

Question. Are there many of them?

Answer. There's another one they call the "cowboy" who has been seen. He wears a cowboy hat, is barechested, wears Levis and boots.

Question. But they aren't there in great numbers—

Answer. No.

#### ED INFLUX: INCREASING

Question. How many men are going into South Vietnam from the North?

Answer. It seems to me a never-ending procession.

Question. Is it increasing?

Answer. It seems to be increasing. We feel it is.

Question. How do they get in there? Do the Communists come in directly across the border between North and South Vietnam, or do they come down through the Ho Chi Minh trail through Laos?

Answer. They almost never come in directly across the border between North and South Vietnam—almost never. They come down over the Laotian border, come in through Tayninh Province, generally, where it is believed is the headquarters of the whole Vietcong operation.

Question. Is that all in Laos, or in Cambodia, too?

Answer. They come through Laos and Cambodia. I was with several special forces camps along the border. The Vietcong come down from North Vietnam and just make a little jog through Laos and into South Vietnam.

Question. How about Communist weapons? Is it true that some are shipped by boat into Cambodia, and then sent across?

Answer. Not necessarily. Intelligence sources feel that the weapons are coming down from China by junk, coming by sea right to the delta region of the Mekong River, coming directly to the Vietcong in South Vietnam. There just isn't much you can do about it.

#### CUTTING OFF SUPPLIES

Question. Can that land traffic be stopped in any way, other than carrying the war into North Vietnam?

Answer. Yes. I have one proposal which I feel would help. Instead of having only 40 special forces A teams, have 100. We've got plenty of them mowing the lawns at Fort Bragg. As a matter of fact, the joke is that the master sergeants say: "I've got no sweat. I'm a master sergeant. I get a power mower at Bragg, and the rest of them have to push hand mowers."

Here are men who have been approved for release place? 10 years—I'm talking about enlisted men, sergeants—to be the finest fighting men, and

are the most mature fighting men in the world, and what are they doing?—mowing lawns.

Question. You want to see 100 teams, instead of 40?

Answer. I'd like to see it. And this is what I think special forces would like to do.

Question. Why can't that supply route through Laos be cut?

Answer. Go into Laos from Vietnam? Well, there's no reason why we couldn't, except that it's not the policy of the U.S. Government to do it now.

On the other hand, we don't really have to do it. If we put 40 or 50 Special Forces teams right up to the Laos border—each one 20 or 25 miles from the next—these guys would hold them off, because the Vietcong never go into one of these 25-mile areas dominated by Special Forces. They go around them. They would do anything rather than go through a Special Forces area.

Question. When you said the U.S. equipment and weapons are good, were you talking only about the Special Forces?

Answer. I'm talking about the ARVN, too. I've been out with the ARVN battalions.

Question. What about U.S. airplanes?

Answer. Well, the airplanes are different.

Question. You're familiar with Captain Shank's letters? (Capt. Edwin Gerald Shank, Jr., whose letters were published in the May 4 issue of U.S. News & World Report, was a U.S. Air Force flier who was killed while on a combat mission in South Vietnam.)

Answer. Yes, indeed I am. I spent a lot of time with the Air Force. They're naturally concerned about getting the best equipment possible. I went down to Bien Hoa. Bien Hoa and Soc Trang are the two areas where most of these fliers are. They won't talk to a reporter if they can avoid it, because it's their career if their name is mentioned in connection with any criticism.

Question. Is the Air Force getting less consideration, less new equipment, than the Special Forces get?

Answer. That's comparing oranges and apples. Special Forces has its own logistical operation. Now, unfortunately, that's ending, and logistics will come under the domination of MAAG and MAC-V. But this was the greatest logistical operation I've ever seen, up in Nha Trang. It could resupply in hours, if necessary, any Special Forces camp that needed it. Special Forces is set up to support another 100 teams.

Now U.S. high command in Vietnam is changing things. This is what I can't understand.

You see, conventional military men don't operate the way Special Forces do. What happens is this: You have a conventional officer writing the efficiency report for a Special Forces officer, and he'll say: "This officer here has wild ideas. We don't understand him. He doesn't like us. He called me a 'leg'." That's what you call anybody who doesn't jump—"leg."

Now, this is wrong. You can't have men who have been trained 10 or 12 years to be unconventional, and then shove them under conventional control.

Question. And this is in the process of being done—

Answer. It was done May 1.

Question. Mr. Moore, is there a feeling that the United States is getting ready to pull out? Is that the feeling?

Answer. I don't think it's to pull out. I think it's to fight a different kind of war. They have changed this whole thing. Special Forces efficiency is being greatly damaged by having to work under officers and generals who are not oriented toward unconventional warfare—and yet, that's the war we've got to fight in Vietnam.

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Question. Do the Vietnamese people seem to want us there?

Answer. Oh, yes.

#### WHO REALLY FIGHTS?

Question. Is it a popular war?

Answer. Yes. One thing I haven't touched on is that perhaps a third of the population are Montagnards, and they get along extremely well with us. Our best fighters are Montagnards.

Question. Are they in the irregulars?

Answer. Yes. The problem you have, though, is that the Montagnards and Vietnamese hate each other. Until recently, the Vietnamese used to bomb the Montagnard villages indiscriminately, claiming they were Vietcong villages. But they're beginning to pull this together now. Maj. Gen. Nguyen Khanh (South Vietnam's leader) is making a big effort to get together with the Montagnards.

All over Vietnam, I've heard Montagnard leaders come up to the Americans and say: "How much longer are you going to stay here? Because, if you leave, we're not going to fight any more. The Vietnamese don't care about us. We're fighting for you."

And the Americans say: "No, you're not fighting for us. You're fighting for your Vietnamese Government in Saigon."

To this the Montagnards reply: "Well, we don't care about them. We're fighting because the Americans are here and treat us well, pay us well, build good villages for us, give us pigs, take care of us."

Question. In spite of the effectiveness of the Special Forces, the reports are that the war is being lost—

Answer. Yes, but we would have lost it a lot faster if Special Forces hadn't been in there.

Question. Are we going to lose it now?

Answer. If we don't change the ground rules, we're going to lose it. This is what everybody says. Just change the ground rules enough so that, with our equipment and our good officers and sergeants and our communications ability, and bringing in new planes—as Secretary McNamara says we're going to do—we can make these people win.

But we can't make them win unless we are in a position to say: "Do this, do this, do this"—and see that they do it.

#### WHY UNITED STATES MUST TAKE OVER

Question. Does that mean the United States must have operational control of the war?

Answer. Operation control.

Question. Of just Special Forces?

Answer. No, the whole thing.

Question. What role do you see for the conventional Vietnamese Army there?

Answer. For one thing, it's the job of Vietnamese battalions to do what they haven't done so far, to clean out Vietcong strongholds. One example—an area in Darlac controlled by a Vietcong regiment. The Vietnamese regulars have never dared go in there because, as they say, "too many Vietcong."

Question. So must the United States take operational control of Vietnamese Special Forces plus Vietnamese regular forces?

Answer. Right. Air forces as well as ground forces.

Q. One U.S. officer per battalion—will that provide effective operational control?

Answer. With his sergeants it should, yes.

Question. With no fighting will among the Vietnamese troops—

Answer. I didn't condemn the troops. The troops will fight, if properly picked and properly led. The officers, by and large, don't know how to lead them. They won't take advice, so we've got to go in there and give them commands.

We are creating enough good Vietnamese officers who are slowly coming in so that we can relinquish operational control again. But, if we don't take it over now, we're going to get licked.

Answer. We should be there to win.

1964

The last battle I was in was the 6th of May, in the delta near Tan Phu, and the Vietnamese—two battalions—thought they were going to crush a couple of Vietcong companies. Instead of that, it turned out it was a Vietcong regiment. It surrounded the Vietnamese for the day.

The Vietcong lobbed in mortar shells and hit them with recoilless rifles. I could hear the American advisers on the radio saying, "We're surrounded." It lasted that way for the day until, at 6 o'clock, the Vietcong just disappeared. If under American operational control—the advisers felt—the Vietnamese would have fought their way out, or, better still, would not have fallen into the trap in the first place.

Question. Are American advisers becoming defeatists as a result of this?

Answer. No; they're not—they're not at all. They fight and they aren't defeatists at all. If anything, the more rebuffs they get, the harder they fight to get operational control.

I've had a lot of good friends killed and wounded—battalion advisers, as well as Special Forces. Incidentally, the Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg has trained most of the battalion advisers, as well as the Special Forces people. These men never lost heart, no matter how tough things were. They still stayed in there and they still kept advising and trying in any way they could to get their message across to the Vietnamese. When I left they were still just as eager and hardworking and hardfighting as ever.

Question. Do all these Special Forces people see their roles being weakened?

Answer. As some Special Forces say, "We were killed on November 22, also" (the day President Kennedy was assassinated). That's the thing you hear. President Kennedy was the one who kept it going.

Question. Are there any difficulties put in the way of Special Forces by State Department policies or wishes out there?

Answer. The Special Forces follow whatever State Department policy is. Special Forces are very careful, for instance, not to violate the Laotian border.

I was there when a good friend of mine—one of our favorite captains—went down in a recon plane, and we thought he might have gone over the Laotian border. As much as they wanted to get him, Special Forces never went across the border. They tried for 2 weeks, through our diplomatic channels, to get a search made on the Laotian side of the border. But Special Forces—even to get this man back—never so much as poked a toe across the border. They were very careful not to; they are unconventional, but only within the confines of fighting the war in South Vietnam.

Question. Are they going to have to violate these borders in order to cut the Communist supply lines?

Answer. We can win by staying within South Vietnam, if we have Special Forces. A teams solidly right up and down the whole border.

Question. Are you convinced that the United States can win this war without going into Laos and into North Vietnam?

Answer. I'm convinced of that. I'm convinced that it's not necessary to bomb North Vietnam. If you bomb North Vietnam, that isn't going to stop those 80,000 Communists in South Vietnam. No matter what you do to North Vietnam, the guerrillas are going to be in the South. And they'll get supplied, one way or another. Red China will supply them.

ENEMY. 80,000 STRONG

Question. Where did you get that figure of 80,000? We keep hearing 25,000—

Answer. It's 80,000 total. There are 25,000 hard-core Communists from North Vietnam, or North Vietnamese, there. But they have with them maybe 60,000 to even 80,000 irregulars who fight for

them part time, farm part time, but are still sympathetic enough to take up arms and fight.

Question. You talk about winning. When is the war won?

Answer. That's only part of the question. Suppose you clean up all the VC; suppose you get South Vietnam back to normal—you can drive on the roads, and the farmers can farm and all that—then the tougher question is: How do you keep it won?

I should think the war is basically won when we can pull out safely and not have to worry about further outbreaks of fighting. At that point you have not gone beyond the borders of South Vietnam.

Question. Do you have to reunify North and South Vietnam to get a final peace?

Answer. That gets under politics. All I could do is tell you what you know as well as I do.

Question. Beyond Vietnam, what's at stake in the whole of southeast Asia? Will there ever be a really trained South Vietnamese Army, or a trained Thai Army able to withstand aggression by the Communists?

Answer. Thais, Laotians, Vietnamese—they're all the same, basically: They're delightful people, socially. They're good, hard-working people. The officer corps of Thailand is made up of the most delightful people I've ever met. The Thai officers went to the same U.S. schools as the Vietnamese.

But they have the same problem in Thailand, because they aren't combat leaders, really, and I don't know how we're going to keep Red China from engulfing the whole thing. I really don't. That goes beyond my scope.

Question. Getting back to South Vietnam—

Answer. Yes, how to stop losing and start winning.

There are two points I want to stress after 5 months of being with it: One, we must take operational control; two, Special Forces must be restored to what they were conceived to be—and we must put in a lot more of them.

Operational control will automatically get the ARVN doing what they are capable of doing, and Special Forces can do that border-patrol job—seal off the borders from the inside. We also need A teams to fight the Vietcong and keep them off balance in their strongholds within South Vietnam. Then we can proceed to clean up the country. But that doesn't mean that, when that job is done, the war is won in all of Indochina.

#### A BUILDUP IS GOING ON

Question. Did you get any feeling that there was a movement to carry the war north over the border, if necessary?

Answer. I did get the feeling—and I know for a fact—that we are building up and getting ready for such an eventuality. Many of these 12,000 Americans who are not in the field are obviously working on problems of logistics and planning and setting up bases in case it is decided to do it.

Yes, there's a buildup going on—no doubt about it.

Question. They're creating the capability—

Answer. The capability, if not already created, is almost created.

Question. Is General Khanh a good man?

Answer. I think so. I think Khanh's the best we've got. If we lose him, we're in real trouble.

Khanh is an aggressive little guy and he's doing his best against odds to surround himself with aggressive people. Since Khanh has been in, you get the feeling he's doing his best. But he's got big political problems. There are people he can't relieve because their families are too important one way or another. He has a very tenuous hold. Sure, America is behind him, but—

Question. Are there powerful families over

the system they have all come up under, and that means that all Khanh's friends came up the same way. They're all interlocking families, interlocking powers, and, much as he'd like to, there are many people Khanh can't just go in and relieve. That's one of our problems—Khanh can't do it.

Question. Could he agree to the kind of operational control that you're talking about for ARVN?

Answer. Yes. I think he maybe actually has already agreed to it, and maybe the problem now is how to carry it out.

I should think he would be in favor of giving the Americans operational control. For one thing, that way, an American officer could remove General Khanh's best friend's son, if that became necessary.

As it stands now, you can see flagrant examples of nepotism and covering up and "face saving." I saw an example in front of my eyes where a Vietnamese officer actually used Vietnamese irregulars to ambush an American officer—his American counterpart—and tried to kill him. Well, they hit an American sergeant instead. Fortunately, they didn't kill him.

But this was a very cleverly set up ambush. So what did they do with the Vietnamese officer? They merely shifted him to another special forces camp.

Question. With a chance to shoot somebody else—

Answer. Yes, exactly.

Question. Where are Vietnamese special forces teams trained?

Answer. They haven't been trained very much up till now. They've been taken directly from the army or were trained in Saigon rather haphazardly. But there is a big new special forces training camp just about finished—north of Saigon. In fact, the first class should just be coming through.

Question. Does the United States have operational control of training?

Answer. Yes, they're running it. They're running the training base, and this is a wonderful sign for the future.

There is one other wonderful sign, and that is the rise of one particular officer. His name is Col. Lam Son. He's been made the head of Vietnamese special forces—the Luc-Luong Dac-Biet. And he's a tough guy. I'll give you an example:

A real miserable Vietnamese special forces captain was being complained about by his American counterpart. Col. Lam Son went up there, grabbed this Vietnamese captain, made him take a small company out and deliberately headed him where he knew there would be fighting. When the captain lay down and started bawling, the colonel grabbed his rifle and said, "Well, you're relieved—out!" And this is the way this guy is now conducting things.

Question. So there is some progress—

Answer. Yes, but to give you an idea of what Col. Lam Son is up against: He went up to the I Corps area and the Vietnamese general in charge of that area said, in effect: "Well, you can stay 24 hours. You'll spend the night at your team, where my people can watch you, and then you'll be out of here. I don't trust you. I think you are going to start a coup up here."

They don't trust each other. That's another one of our big problems. Every Vietnamese general thinks his colleague is going to start the next coup.

Even without a coup, you get these little power plays where all of a sudden one guy is suddenly in jail for some reason and you don't see him any more, and someone else is in command of a unit. Even under General Khanh, there's this constant undercutting of one officer overthrowing another on the next level. This is another reason why, in effect, we're under operational control, we're just going to be at the mercy of these little things which we can't understand.

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I remember hearing this said at MAC-V headquarters: "Every time we see a lot of motion going on and no attacks against the Vietcong, then we know that we're going to be missing a Vietnamese general in a power play." This is one of the problems. Col. Lam Son has got this tremendous opportunity to shape up Vietnam's special forces, and a lot of people would like to get him before he makes a big record for himself—becomes a general, or forces some other general to step aside.

**WHAT UNITED STATES SHOULD DO**

The gist of everything I've said boils down to just two things:

The first is operational control.

The second is much more utility of Special Forces—the best trained, most mature and courageous fighting people we've got, and the least used.

This is the most wasted asset the U.S. Army has—Special Forces. We use only 40 teams in Vietnam and keep the rest of them mowing lawns at Fort Bragg.

**Heinsohn Scare Real "Red" Plot****EXTENSION OF REMARKS  
OF****HON. EDWARD J. DERWINSKI**

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, June 11, 1964

**Mr. DERWINSKI.** Mr. Speaker, very often information of key nature can, interestingly enough, be found in our newspapers' sports sections, especially when we recognize the pride that all nations take in their athletic accomplishments.

I place into the Record an article which appeared in yesterday's Washington Evening Star by Columnist Steve Guback, discussing a recent tour by the National Basketball Association under State Department auspices.

For once, the State Department sponsored an intelligent and practical tour, sending over an outstanding group of American athletes who are certainly a credit to their sport and to the Nation. The success of the competition, as well as the public relations success scored by this team, should merit the serious attention of the State Department, so that similar groups such as this might be utilized in oversea programs, instead of having the Nation embarrassed by mediocre performers or neurotic members of the entertainment world.

The article follows:

**SPORTS SPOTLIGHT—HEINSOHN SCARE REAL "RED" PLOT**  
(By Steve Guback)

Those National Basketball Association all-stars won all 21 games on their recent oversea tour, but it was in Poland that Red Auerbach, the local boy who has made good, obviously scored his greatest personal triumph.

As almost everybody knows, Auerbach is the coach of the Boston Celtics—that is, when he's not busily occupied with his basketball camp, making speeches, or on good will junkets for the State Department. One of his stars is Tom Heinsohn, a large 218-pound party who made the oversea trip and is not easily intimidated, except in rare instances.

Auerbach leaned back apprehensively for other day, with a little twinkle in his eye. He had the look of complete satisfaction, as if he had just devised a new play that was

guaranteed to produce three points at any time.

"Now Heinsohn is a German name," Red began, "and you know how the Polish hate the Germans, with good reason, I guess.

"So we got these two coaches in Poland and rehearsed them. We dressed them up in trench coats, with hats pulled down over their eyes and brief cases."

It sounded sinister and it was, and you began feeling sorry already for Heinsohn because, if there is one thing about Auerbach, it's that he knows how to plan and follow through. Six consecutive NBA titles illustrate that.

At any rate, the two Polish coaches trudged up to Heinsohn's hotel room while Auerbach and Bob Cousy hid down below. The officials rapped hard on Heinsohn's door, drew him outside, angrily demanded to see his passport, and then marched him stiffly off—one on each side.

Heinsohn's startled pleas got him nowhere. The Polish coaches couldn't speak English and Heinsohn couldn't speak Polish.

Auerbach and Cousy watched the scene, muffing their laughter. "Geez, he was chain smoking and everything," Auerbach guffawed.

"I went up to him and said: 'What's the matter, Tom, you look kinda green?'

"I dunno," Heinsohn said. "These guys are arresting me or something."

With a wave of his hand, Auerbach took command. He interceded, suggested that everybody have a drink, and marched the group into the bar, where the rest of the NBA stars were waiting.

"When Heinsohn saw the team in there, he exploded," Auerbach reported. "He realized then it was a gag. As he screamed, Cousy and the rest of guys roared in the aisle with laughter. People in the hotel must have thought we were crazy or something," Red added brightly.

People in Yugoslavia, Rumania, Egypt and Poland also must think a bit more now about American basketball after the pros' grand tour. The U.S. amateur team, Auerbach said, had left a terrible impression when they lost most of their games overseas. But the pros won all 21 games by a margin of at least 20 points and quickly restored the idea that the Americans are still the best in the world.

"The people over there don't know nothing except who wins," Auerbach explained. "They cannot believe we'd send over a team like that amateur club unless it was our best. They do not know the difference between amateur and pro. They can't understand that some of our best NCAA players are still in school."

It's Auerbach's belief that the United States should never send a team overseas unless it is representative of our best, and it makes sense.

"All this jazz about good sportsmanship," Auerbach shrugged. "That's part of good will but most countries respect ability. What they see is what they think."

Auerbach will explain this in great detail to the State Department when he makes his report later this week. However, it is unlikely that the Heinsohn episode will be mentioned. The State Department always gets uneasy when they hear of "Red" plots even if the last name is Auerbach.

**A Prayer for Civil Rights****EXTENSION OF REMARKS  
OF****HON. ABRAHAM J. MULTER**

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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importers of cotton goods from Japan, Hong Kong, and India are the interested parties in this move.

**Mr. MULTER.** Mr. Speaker, Rabbi Uri Miller, president of the Synagogue Coun-

cil of America, has written the following prayer which expresses the belief that our people are one people and that when one part of our society suffers we all suffer.

I commend Rabbi Miller's prayer to the attention of our colleagues:

**PRAYER OF RABBI URI MILLER, PRESIDENT OF SYNAGOGUE COUNCIL OF AMERICA, ON CIVIL RIGHTS**

Our father's God, God of the spirit of all flesh, we invoke Thy blessing upon this assemblage of citizens who have gathered here to demonstrate for freedom, bread, and the dignity of man. Thou hath endowed all men equally with the right to life, to liberty, and to the pursuit of happiness. Enable us, through this demonstration, to sensitize all Americans and especially those in position of power and authority to this concept of equality. May we understand that when we deprive our fellowman of bread and dignity we negate the Iselen Elokin—the image of God in man—and delay the fulfillment of Thy kingdom.

Enable us to understand that our society—the American people—is of one piece; that when any part of this society suffers, we all suffer. May we understand that he who discriminates is as morally hurt as is the one discriminated against, physically hurt; that he who is prejudiced may injure the object of his prejudice, and also degrades the society of which he himself is a part.

Above all we pray we become cognizant in ever-increasing measure that our religious ideals must be fulfilled in actual living experience. Our traditions must be given flesh in the form of social justice now. Freedom, pride, and dignity must be not empty words nor even sincere ideals projected into some messianic future, but actualities expressed in our society in concrete and tangible form now.

May we never forfeit our liberties or condone cowardice, prejudice, and self-indulgence. May we ever expand the area of human freedom in our midst and thus serve Thee and Thy love of law and justice. May we demonstrate our gratitude for the blessed privilege of living under the Stars and Stripes by giving to bigotry no sanction, to persecution no assistance. Banish hatred, pride, and arrogance from our midst and inspire us "to do justice, love mercy, and walk humbly" with Thee.

Hasten now the coming of the happy day when the message of Thy prophets shall be fulfilled; when men shall break their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks and no longer learn the art of war; when the earth shall be filled of the knowledge of the Lord as the waters cover the sea.

**Some Exporters and Importers Would Wreck International Textile Agreements****EXTENSION OF REMARKS  
OF****HON. W. J. BRYAN DORN**

OF SOUTH CAROLINA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, June 11, 1964

**Mr. DORN.** Mr. Speaker my attention was drawn recently to press reports that an effort may be made to use the recently enacted one-price cotton law as a weapon against the international agreements under which trade is now being done in cotton textiles.